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Environmental Quality as a National Good in
a Federal State
Richard B. Stewartt
I. THE PUZZLINGLY PERSISTENT DOMINANCE OF FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
How is it that we have so much federal environmental law of
the sort that we have in the United States? The persistent domi-
nance of centralized federal environmental regulation is hard to
explain positively under public choice analysis of political behav-
ior, or normatively under welfare economic analysis relying on
market failure paradigms and the principle of optimal environ-
mental jurisdictions.
Under conventional public choice accounts, small, relatively
homogenous interests that face concentrated, front-loaded, high
per capita costs and that have the opportunity to use regulatory
programs to create and capture economic rents will generally
prevail in legislative and administrative determinations of regu-
latory policy over diffuse, heterogenous interests seeking small
per capita, long-run benefits.1 On this account, it is very hard to
explain the sweeping and intrusive programs of command-and-
control federal regulation and environmental liabilities for indus-
trial processes, products, and resource exploitation that have
largely dictated environmental policy in the United States over
the past twenty-five years. These programs include: the pollution
control and liability programs established by the Clean Air Act,2
t Emily Kampin Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. Thanks to
Richard Revesz for helpful comments.'
' See James Buchanan and Gorden Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Michigan
1962); Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups (Harvard 1965); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J
Econ & Mgmt Sci 3 (1971); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,
19 J L & Econ 211 (1976); Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups
for Political Influence, 98 Q J Econ 371 (1983); Roger G. Noll, Economic Perspectives on
the Politics of Regulation, in Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig, eds, 2 Handbook
of Industrial Organization 1253, 1258-69 (Elsevier Science 1989).
2 42 USC § 7401 et seq (1994).
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the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("Clean Water Act"),3
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA), the Safe
Drinking Water Act ("SDWA"),5 the Toxic Substances Control
Act ("TSCA"),6 the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA), 7 the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act ("EPCRA7), and
the Oil Pollution Act;9 wetlands regulation under the Clean Wa-
ter Act; 0 the regulation of development on private lands under
the Endangered Species Act ("ESA");" the Federal Environmen-
tal Pesticide Control Act of 1972, which significantly strength-
ened the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
("FIFRA7), and so on. While these statutes generally allow
states to adopt more stringent standards and requirements, and
often accord the states a substantial-albeit subsidiary and feder-
ally supervised-role in implementation and enforcement, the
general direction and ambitious stringency of environmental
requirements as well as an elaborate array of implementing de-
tails have been set by Congress and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency ("EPA").
It is possible to point to a few instances of industry support
for preemptive federal regulation of nationally marketed products
in order to foreclose inconsistent and potentially more burden-
some state regulation. Examples include federal regulation under
the Clean Air Act of emissions from new automobiles that pre-
empted more stringent state regulation,"3 and regulation of pes-
33 USC § 1251 et seq (1994).
42 USC § 6901 et seq (1994).
42 USC § 300f et seq (1994 & Supp 1996).
6 15 USC § 2601 et seq (1994).
42 USC § 9601 et seq (1994).
42 USC § 11001 et seq (1994).
33 USC § 2701 et seq (1994).
10 33 USC § 1344 (1994).
11 16 USC § 1538 (1994). See Babbitt v Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon, 515 US 687 (1995) (upholding a Department of the Interior regulation
defining habitat modification on private lands that adversely affects individual members
of species listed as endangered or threatened as a "taking" prohibited by the ESA).
12 Federal Environmental Pesticide Control of Act of 1972, Pub L No 92-516, 86 Stat
973, amending the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 USC § 136 et
seq (1994).
II Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 § 209(b), Pub L No 95-95, 91 Stat 685, 756,
codified at 42 USC § 7541. See also E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman, and John C.
Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental
Law, 1 J L Econ & Org 313, 329-332 (1985). The soft coal industry similarly acquiesced in
federal legislation based on ambient air quality to deflect state regulation of fuel inputs
aimed at soft coal. Id at 331.
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ticide labeling under FIFRA, which preempted inconsistent state
regulation. 4 At least in the case of FIFRA, however, the pre-
emptive provision was only a part of major new regulatory initia-
tive that, overall, was significantly adverse to the interests of the
regulated industry.
Affirmative industry support for major new federal regulato-
ry initiatives is rare. The particular features of new or modified
federal regulatory programs, however, often reflect successful
efforts by industrial interests, sometimes in alliance with envi-
ronmental advocates, to use regulation to maintain or gain com-
petitive advantage and extract rents. Examples include national-
ly uniform technology-based effluent limitation requirements
under the Clean Water Act, 5 the Clean Air Act's Prevention of
Significant Deterioration program ("PSD")," the New Source
Performance Standards for SO2 emissions from coal-fired power
plants, 7 the preference in Superfund for permanent treatment
of hazardous waste rather than containment and institutional
controls, 8 and the preferences for ethanol fuels in the 1990
The Clean Air Act's preemption of state automobile emission standards, however,
contains an exception for the more stringent California standards, subject to approval by
EPA. The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments provided that states other than California
could adopt the California standards for regions that have not achieved compliance with
the National Ambient Air Quality standards for automotive pollutants. § 177, 91 Stat at
750, codified at 42 USC § 7507.
Such instances of preemptive federal regulation may be understood as industry
efforts to head off a "race to the top" in which states with large markets adopt stringent
environmental regulations for products, where a substantial portion of the burden of such
regulations is borne by out-of-state interests. See David Vogel, Trading Up: Consumer
and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy (Harvard 1995). Peter P. Swire, The
Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among
Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 Yale L & Pol Rev 67, 81-87 (1996) (discussing
limited applicability of "race-to-the-top").
1 Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act § 24(b), 86 Stat at 997, codified at 7
USC § 136v(b). The 1972 Amendments to FIFRA transferred administration of FIFRA
from the Department of Agriculture to the EPA and in other ways significantly
strengthened federal regulation of pesticides. The legislative history is reviewed in Donald
T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms and Politics of
Environmental Law Reform, 10 Yale J Reg 369, 420-35 (1993); Kevin McElroy, Josh H.
Kardisch, and Joseph J. Ortego, The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act:
Preemption and Toxic Tort Law, 2 Fordham Envir L Rep 29 (1990).
33 USC § 1311 (1994). See Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environ-
ment, and the Future 22 n 10 (Institute for International Economics 1994).
16 42 USC § 7470-79 (1994). See B. Peter Pashigian, Environmental Regulation:
Whose Self-Interests Are Being Protected? 23 Econ Inquiry 551 (1985).
"7 See Bruce A. Ackerman and William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air 2 (Yale
1981), citing 44 Fed Reg 33580-624 (1979).
'a 42 USC § 9621(bXl) (1994). See Marc K. Landy and Mary Hague, The Coalition for
Waste: Private Interests and Superfund, in Michael S. Greve and Fred L. Smith, Jr., eds,
Environmental Politics: Public Costs, Private Rewards 67, 74-81 (Praeger 1992).
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Clean Air Act amendments.19 But such particular rent-seeking
features in federal environmental regulatory programs cannot
account for these and other regulatory programs as a whole.2"
Public choice theory is hard pressed to explain how diffuse
environmental interests, even with the support of the pollution
control and waste treatment industry,21 have succeeded in erect-
ing, maintaining, implementing, and enforcing a cumbersome,
stringent, and costly regulatory system adverse to the basic inter-
ests of U.S. industry. This imposing edifice of federal law repre-
sents the most costly, and surely the most burdensome, system of
environmental regulation and liability in the world, to the detri-
ment of U.S. industry in a world of increasingly tough interna-
tional competition.22 How can this phenomenon be explained
consistent with public choice theory?
Some variants of public choice theory use the notion of sa-
liency to account for some federal environmental programs. The
theory is that dramatic, psychologically salient events can be
exploited by media and political entrepreneurs to mobilize atten-
tion, outrage, and political power (including voting or predicted
voting by constituents) in favor of federal initiatives, and thereby
temporarily overcome the persistent structural impediments to
the effective organization of diffuse interests with individually
small stakes." Examples of salient events associated with feder-
al legislative initiatives include: Love Canal and CERCLA;
Bhopal and EPCRA; and the Exxon Valdez spill and the Oil Pol-
lution Act.' These examples capture a politically important phe-
nomenon, albeit in exaggerated fashion. But episodic saliency
'9 Pub L No 101-549, 104 Stat 2489, 2490, codified at 42 USC § 7545 (1994). See
Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Fuels, Dirty Air, in Greve and Smith, Environmental Politics 19,
39 (cited in note 18).
' See Elliott, Ackerman, and Millian, 1 J L Econ & Org at 317-18 (cited in note 13)
(inability of public choice theory to account for 1970 Clean Air Act); Hornstein, 10 Yale J
Reg at 420-35 (1993) (cited in note 14) (many features of 1972 Amendments to FIFRA not
explicable by public choice theory).
1 Political alliances between environmental groups and the waste treatment industry
are illustrated in Landy and Hague, The Coalition for Waste at 74-81 (cited in note 18);
Jonathan H. Adler, Rent Seeking Behind the Green Curtain, 26 Regulation (No 4, 1996).
' Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness,
102 Yale L J 2039 (1993).
' See Bradley C. Bobertz, Legitimizing Pollution Through Pollution Control Laws:
Reflections on Scapegoating Theory, 73 Tex L Rev 711 (1995); Anthony Downs, Up and
Down with Ecology-The "issue-attention cycle", 28 Pub Interest 38 (Summer 1972);
Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J L Econ & Org 59, 78-
79 (1992); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest
and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J L Econ & Org 167 (1990).
24 Bobertz, 73 Tex L Rev at 734, 737-41 (cited in note 23).
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cannot account for the overall magnitude of federal environmen-
tal regulation, or its persistence. Many very burdensome federal
programs, including the original Clean Air Act and its 1990
Amendments, RCRA, the 1986 SARA amendments to CERCLA,
wetlands regulation, and the extension of Endangered Species
Act regulation to private development activities, cannot be even
partially explained in terms of dramatic media events. And how
to explain the persistence and intensification of federal regulato-
ry programs after the salient event has passed?' Further, sa-
liency alone cannot explain why arousal of public concern leads
to national rather than state regulation.'m
Our burdensome, top-heavy system of federal environmental
regulation also cannot be accounted for normatively under con-
temporary welfare economic analysis, which regards environmen-
tal quality as a commodity. The level of environmental quality to
be provided is a function of discrete individual preferences and
wealth. When, as is often the case, environmental quality is a
collective good, markets often fail to provide adequate levels of'
environmental quality (defined in terms of aggregating individual
demand) and regulatory or other government measures may be
necessary in order to correct this market failure. The correlative
theory of optimal environmental jurisdictions holds that govern-
ment measures to correct such failures should be adopted by the
level of government most closely congruent with those who will
obtain the benefits (typically defined in terms of improvements in
environmental quality such as cleaner air, which individuals
directly experience) and bear the costs of those measures.27
While this criterion is obviously difficult to apply in practice
because environmental problems do not neatly match political
jurisdictional boundaries, it nonetheless dictates that federal
environmental regulation and liability should be the rare excep-
tion rather than, as is the case, the rule. This criterion may ex-
plain and justify federal environmental regulation of nationally
marketed products such as automobiles, because the costs of'
2' The salient event may be exploited by media/political entrepreneurs to establish or
expand federal bureaucracies and enact "action-forcing" statutory mandates enforceable
by citizen suits in the courts in order to lock in and perpetuate a regulatory initiative once
the salient event has faded. But how does the program continue to win political support
for appropriations and government implementation and enforcement initiatives?
SIt has been suggested that the dominance of the national media makes national
legislation a likely response to widely publicized environmental incidents. See Swire, 14
Yale L & Pol Rev at 109 (cited in note 13).
"7 See Richard 0. Zerbe, Optimal Environmental Jurisdictions, 4 Ecol L Q 193 (1974).
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state regulation may be borne in significant part by those outside
the state, and because inconsistent state regulations may reduce
national welfare by preventing realization of scale economies.'
As noted above, in such cases industry may support federal prod-
uct regulation, especially if it is preemptive of state regulation.'
But most environmental problems associated with industrial,
agricultural, and development processes-including water pollu-
tion, most forms of air pollution (including toxic air pollutants),
hazardous waste disposal and clean up, oil spills, contamination
of drinking water, and habitat and ecosystem conversion-are
local in their effects; occasionally they are regional, affecting two
or more states.3 0 The number of problems that extend over wide
areas of the nation or beyond are very few: acid deposition, ozone
transport, greenhouse gases, and stratospheric ozone-depleting
chemicals. Since most environmental problems are local, the
benefits of government measures to address these problems will
also be local. Moreover, given a substantial degree of capital and
personal mobility, it is likely that the costs of local measures to
address local environmental problems will primarily be borne
locally."1 Further, there are likely to be local variations in geo-
graphic, ecological, meteorological and other physical circum-
stances, the level and type of industrial, commercial, and other
development, and the costs of achieving higher levels of environ-
mental quality. There are also likely to be variations in local
populations' environmental preferences and priorities. These
" These considerations, however, do not necessarily justify a single, uniform national
standard. See David Harrison, Jr., How to Save More Than $1 Billion Per Year and Help
the Poor Too, 25 Pub Pol 527 (1977) (discussing the federal "two car" strategy with differ-
ent levels of control for cars used in more polluted and in less polluted regions).
2' See text accompanying notes 13-14.
3' Transboundary movement of wastes presents distinct issues, arising in part from
the Supreme Court's treatment of wastes as articles of commerce under the Commerce
Clause and its consequent prohibition of state or local measures that discriminate against
disposal of wastes originating outside the jurisdiction. See Chemical Waste Management,
Inc. v Hunt, 504 US'334 (1992); Fort Gratoit Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v Michigan Depart-
ment of Natural Resources, 504 US 353 (1992); Richard Stewart, International Trade and
Environment: Lessons from the Federal Experience, 49 Wash & Lee L Rev 1329 (1992)
(examining transboundary waste trade in an international perspective).
3 There may be exceptions to this generalization, for example in the case of imposi-
tion of burdensome controls on already established capital-intensive facilities, such as
those in the chemical industry. In these circumstances, industry may support federal
legislation. See, for example, text accompanying notes 28-29; Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Environmental Policy and Federal Structure: A Comparison of the United States and
Germany, 47 Vand L Rev 1587, 1592 n 12 (1994) (support by chemical industry for uni-
form national standards for treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous wastes).
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variations can best be accommodated by setting standards local-
ly.3
2
Accordingly, welfare economic analysis within the optimal
environmental jurisdiction framework would conclude that, prima
facie, environmental regulation of processes should largely be
carried out at the state and local level, and that the federal role
should be limited to dealing with significant transboundary pollu-
tion spillovers. Federal programs of regulation liability are, how-
ever, far more extensive than this limited prescription would
allow. Federal law minutely controls wholly local problems such
as toxic waste generation, treatment, disposal, and cleanup, local
water pollution, toxic air pollution, and local development activi-
ties.' Moreover, while interstate pollution problems have often
been invoked as a justification for many federal environmental
regulatory programs, such programs in fact are generally not
designed to address, nor do they deal effectively with, such
spillovers.34 Further, interstate pollution spillovers do not neces-
sarily justify federal regulation. Regional arrangements may be
appropriate for some problems; 5 such arrangements could be
encouraged and supported by the federal government. 6
In addition to pollution spillovers from one state to the next,
there are also what might be termed "preservation spillovers."
Citizens in one state may derive satisfaction from the preserva-
tion of a natural resource located in another state, such as a
wilderness reserve or endangered species, even though they nev-
er visit the resource. Because of the absence of workable markets
for pure preservation values, the state in which the resource is
located may lack adequate incentives to preserve it. Federal
measures, such as ownership of national parks or wilderness
areas or regulation to protect highly regarded endangered spe-
cies, may be justified in order to correct the resulting market
32 See, for example, Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Re-
thinking the 'Race-to-the Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67
NYU L Rev 1210, 1221, 1227-33 (1992).
' See, for example, statutes described in notes 2-12 and accompanying text.
See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144
U Pa L Rev 2341 (1996); Rose-Ackerman, 47 Vand L Rev at 1607-11 (cited in note 31);
Comment, Interstate Air Pollution: Over a Decade of Ineffective Regulation, 64 Chi-Kent L
Rev 619 (1988).
See, for example, Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7506a (1994) (establishing interstate
transport commission to address regional ozone air pollution in Northeast United States).
Alternatively, in lieu of direct regulatory sources and pollution spillovers, the
federal government could establish clear entitlements between upwind or upstream states
and downwind or downstream states, leaving enforcement to the states; any necessary ad-
justments would be left to bargaining between states.
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failure.17 This rationale, however, also has only limited applica-
tion and cannot justify the great bulk of federal environmental
legislation.
Analysts have identified other considerations, in addition to
interstate pollution spillovers, that might provide justifications
for extensive federal environmental regulation." It cannot be
said, however, that they have made the case for massive federal
regulatory and liability programs. For example, it has been sug-
gested that economies of scale might make it significantly cheap-
er to have a single environmental regulatory program at the
national level than develop fifty different regulatory programs at
the state level.3" There are undoubtedly significant economies of
scale in research and analysis that justify a strong federal role in
generating information about the effects of pollution and resource
development, the technologies and methods available to limit
environmental degradation, and the advantages and disadvantag-
es of different types of government measures for environmental
protection. But economies of scale in centralized collection and
analysis of information do not necessarily justify centralized
standards and regulations, especially in the case of process regu-
lation. Instead, the federal government could provide data and
analysis to the states, who would use them in determining regu-
latory requirements appropriate to local circumstances. ° On the
other hand, our current, heavily centralized system of federal
command-and-control standards and regulations suffers from
serious diseconomies of scale because of its inherent inability to
ascertain and appropriately respond to significant variations in
local conditions and the circumstances of individual facilities.41
3' See Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitu-
tional Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking- Lessons from the Clean
Air Act, 62 Iowa L Rev 713, 722, 756-58 (1977).
' Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L J 1196, 1210-22 (1977).
9 Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 Mich L Rev 570, 613-
615 (1996).
o Large industrial firms operating in a number of states, however, may prefer a
single set of federal process standards in order to avoid the costs of learning about and
devising compliance strategies for differing state requirements and thereby achieve
economies of scale. On the other hand, firms operating in only one or two states would
probably prefer state standards that are likely to be better adapted to their particular
circumstances. Accordingly, the adoption of federal process standards may, in part, reflect
efforts by multistate firms to gain comparative advantage over competitors or to avoid
comparative disadvantage.
" See Bruce Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
Stan L Rev 1333 (1985) (documenting huge economic waste caused by centralized com-
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Another effort to justify federal environmental regulation on
welfare economic grounds is the so-called "race to the bottom" or
"race to laxity" thesis, which holds that competition among states
for industrial investment will lead all states to adopt lower envi-
ronmental standards than their citizens would prefer.42 Given
the inability, because of transaction costs, of the fifty states to
deal with this "federalism failure" by interstate compact, national
environmental regulation is an appropriate means of forestalling
the "race" through adoption of national standards that impose a
regulatory floor.' Professor Revesz, however, has shown that on
theoretic grounds the "race to the bottom" scenario is implausi-
ble." In addition, the scenario lacks substantial empirical sup-
port. Except in a few instances, the costs of environmental regu-
lation are too small a factor in total production costs to signifi-
cantly affects investment location decisions by industry.45
Nonetheless, the possibility that state competition for indus-
try investment may lead to suboptimal state environmental regu-
lation can not be entirely foreclosed." Further, many political
actors, including industry and environmental representatives,
apparently believe, or in any event assert, that environmental
regulation significantly affect industry decisions about invest-
mand-and-control regulation because of inherent tendencies towards uniformity and
rigidity that ignore variations among sources in marginal control costs and variations in
the degree of control needed to meet ambient environmental quality standards). Despite
.reinventing government" programs, federal environmental regulations have continued to
proliferate; new EPA regulations rose from 358 in 1993 to 430 in 1996. Clyde Wayne
Crews, Ten Thousand Commandments: A Policy Maker's Snapshot of the Federal Regu-
latory State 14 (Competitive Enterprise Institute 1996).
12 Swire, 14 Yale L & Pol Rev 67 (cited in note 13).
13 See Stewart, 86 Yale L J at 1197-1210 (cited in note 38).
Revesz, 67 NYU L Rev at 1244-47 (cited in note 32). Professor Revesz makes the
further point that, to the extent that competition for industry drives states' regulatory,
tax, and fiscal policies, limiting competition in environmental regulation through adoption
of uniform minimum federal standards will simply shift competition into other sectors of
state policy. See also Alvin K. Iaevorik, The Race to the Bottom in a Federal System: Les-
sons from the World of Trade Policy, 14 Yale L & Pol Rev 177 (1996).
* See Adam B. Jaffe, et al, Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of
U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J Econ Lit 132 (1995); Stewart,
102 Yale L J at 2061-83 (cited in note 22); Arik Levenson, Environmental Regulations and
Manufacturers' Location Choices: Evidence from the Census of Manufacturers, 62 J Pub
Econ 5 (1996). But see Vernon Henderson, Effects of Air Quality Regulation, 86 Am Econ
Rev 789 (1996) (finding migration of industry from regions that become non-attainment
under the Clean Air Act and impose more burdensome controls).
" See Swire, 14 Yale & Policy Rev at 95-98 (cited in note 13) (arguing that firms are
better able to measure costs of more stringent environmental controls than state officials
are to measure benefits as a factor that may foster "race to laxity").
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ment and location.47 There is ample evidence that the financial
impact of environmental regulation is thought by industrial firms
to be sufficiently important to motivate lobbying efforts to shape
regulatory requirements in ways that will give them a competi-
tive advantage." Based on the present state of evidence and
understanding, however, it must be concluded that proponents of
the "race to the bottom" thesis have failed to carry the burden of
proof. Further, there has been no showing that the welfare loss
that might result from a system of state and local regulation
because of such a "race" is less than the enormous economic
waste generated by the current system of federal regulation."
Finally, there is a potential positive public choice explanation
for federal regulation. It is argued that state and local govern-
ments are generally less responsive to environmental interests
than the federal government because of various structural fac-
tors, including the following:'
* State and local governments have a shorter time horizon than
the federal government, leading to weaker environmental
regulation at the state and local level because the costs of
regulation are front-loaded while many of the benefits will
occur in the future;
*Uncertainties about benefits give state and local politicians
"slack" in dealing with firms who are more closely disciplined
by costs;
*Environmental groups may be better able to organize nationally
than locally on many issues;
*The most important media are national in scope;
See Stewart, 102 Yale L J at 2041-51 (1993) (cited in note 22).
Id at 2045-51; see also text accompanying notes 15-20.
" See Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform: What Do the Government's Numbers Tell
Us?, in Robert W. Hahn, ed, Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved: Getting Better Results from
Regulation 208, 235-44 (Oxford 1996) (even accepting federal regulatory agencies' own
estimates of regulatory costs and benefits, the costs of many federal environmental,
health, and safety regulations far exceed their benefits); Paul R. Portney, Policy Watch:
Economics and the Clean Air Act, 4 J Econ Persp 173 (1990) (estimated costs of 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments substantially exceed benefits); Tammy 0. Tengs and John D.
Graham, The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social Investments in Life-Saving, in Hahn,
ed, Risk, Costs, and Lives Saved 167 (cited in note 49) (excessive regulatory cost resulting
from failure of federal government regulators to prioritize regulatory investments in
saving lives); Stewart, 102 Yale L J at 2068-70 (cited in note 22) (characteristics of federal
regulation in United States appear to penalize productivity much more that regulation of
comparable stringency in Germany and Japan); Ackerman and Stewart, 37 Stan L Rev at
1333 (cited in note 41) (enormous economic waste created by prevailing U.S. system of
centralized, uniform command and control environmental regulatory requirements).
'o Swire, 14 Yale L & Pol Rev 67 (cited in note 13); Stewart, 86 Yale L J 1196 (cited
in note 38).
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*State regulatory bureaucracies are often small and poorly fund-
ed compared to their federal counterparts.
Because of these structural factors, it is claimed, states will
underprovide environmental protection relative to their citizens'
demand for environmental quality. Those demanding higher
levels of environmental protection will accordingly seek and ob-
tain federal legislation and regulation to remedy state
underprovision.51
There are a number of difficulties with this state
underprovision hypothesis and the correlative justification for
federal environmental regulation. The arguments in support of
the hypothesis are undeveloped, untested, and raise many ques-
tions. How can one determine whether and why state officials
discount the future in ways that lead to underprovision?52 Why
should uncertainties in measuring benefits lead to
underprovision at the state and local level but not at the national
level? Why is it easier for environmental groups to organize na-
tionally, where transaction costs would seemingly be greater than
at the state or local levels? Further, as already discussed, public
choice accounts have failed adequately to explain how diffuse
environmental interests have been able to wield sufficient politi-
cal power to obtain federal regulation that will cure the
underprovision problem.53
The public choice account has received far less analytic at-
tention than the others discussed above. It raises very challeng-
ing conceptual and empirical problems, including how to deter-
mine underprovision or overprovision of environmental quality.
There is the further question of whether the structural factors
that distinguish federal and state politics and governance may
" See Swire, 14 Yale L & Pol Rev at 98-104 (cited at note 13).
52 Rivalry for industrial development is sometimes invoked as an explanation for
state shortsightedness and underprovision. But the "race to the bottom" explanation for
state underprovision is analytically distinct and independent of the public choice argu-
ments discussed here. If the "race to the bottom" thesis is correct, states will adopt
suboptimally lax environmental policies even if they are as fully responsive to environ-
mental as to development interests and seek to optimize their citizens' welfare. The public
choice arguments discussed here, however, posit that state officials are unduly responsive
to development interests, to the detriment of their citizens' aggregate welfare. If both the
"race to the bottom" and the public choice underprovision theses are true, there could well
be a synergy between them; interstate rivalry for investment and public choice structural
political factors might interact, leading to even laxer and more suboptimal levels of
environmental protection than would result from either or both without such interaction.
For purposes of analysis, however, the two theses should initially be treated and evaluat-
ed independently.
" See notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
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not result in a counterproductive overprovision of environmental
regulation at the federal level. While the public choice thesis
deserves much further study, it is fair to say that the case at
present is not proven." From a normative perspective, even if
there were significant welfare losses associated with state regula-
tory underprovision of environmental quality, there has also been
no showing that these losses are greater than those created by
the enormous inefficiencies of the current federal environmental
regulatory system.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AS A NATIONAL GOOD
The problem exists of how to explain the dominance of feder-
al environmental regulation in the face of public choice skepti-
cism about the political efficacy of diffuse interests and the fail-
ure to develop a convincing welfare economic justification for the
scope and scale of current federal programs.
I think we must simply conclude, as a matter of fact, that
many Americans regard environmental quality as an important
national good that transcends individual or local interest. This
regard is the result of historical, cultural, and political contingen-
cies that have yet to be fully or satisfactorily explained. The
settlement and pioneer experiences; certain strands in American
religious experience and sensibility; the acquisition and retention
of the public lands, including many of exceptional scenic gran-
deur; and growing ambivalence towards technology and estab-
lished economic and governmental institutions, along with other
factors, all seem to have played a role in the emerging recogni-
tion of environmental quality and natural resource preservation
as a national good.
Rather than attempting here to explain how Americans have
come to regard environmental quality as a national good, I will
simply posit it as fact that is reflected in various ways, including
the following:
*Overwhelming support in public opinion polls for strong envi-
ronmental measures 55
It is also frequently asserted that state governments were less successful than the
federal government in responding to the rapidly rising political demands for more
stringent environmental regulation in the late 1960s and the 1970s. Any such failures
may, however, be attributable to factors that are either transitory or of much reduced
importanc6 today, when substantial state programs have been established, environmental
issues persist on political agendas, and many states have taken the initiative in adopting
more stringent requirements than those of the federal government. William R. Lowry, The
Dimensions of Federalism: State Governments and Pollution Control Policies (Duke 1992).
Thus, a recent poll survey found the following responses to the question "We must
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*Widespread, sustained, effective political support for establish-
ing, maintaining, implementing and enforcing far-reaching
federal environmental regulatory programs.
*High levels of membership in and financial contributions to
national environmental groups."
*Evidence of significant individual and constituent concern with
and support for federal resource management and regulatory
programs to secure environmental quality or preserve natu-
ral resources in other parts of the nation."7
These manifestations are most powerful in the case of the
Endangered Species Act, wilderness legislation, and other federal
protect the environment even if it means jobs in your community are lost because of it."
Don't Know/ No
Agree Disagree Answer
East 58% 33% 9%
Midwest 55% 31% 14%
South 58% 31% 11%
West 58% 35% 7%
It found the following responses to the question "Protecting the environment is so
important that requirements and standards cannot be too high and continuing environ-
mental improvements must be made regardless of cost."
Don't Know/ No
Agree Disagree Answer
East 61% 33% 6%
Midwest 55% 40% 4%
South 58% 36% 6%
West 54% 41% 5%
See also Paul Roberts, A Green Coup: The GOP and Environmental Protection, New Re-
public 25 (Nov 20, 1995) (summarizing public backlash against House Republican efforts
to cut back on federal environmental regulation).
' Membership in U.S. environmental groups exceeds two million and annual contri-
butions exceed $3.5 billion. David E. Kalish, 'Green' Credit GOP for Rebound: Environ-
mental Groups Gain Clout, Fort Worth Star-Telegram 1 (June 8, 1995); Robert L.
Paarlberg, A Domestic Dispute: Clinton, Congress, and International Environmental
Policy, 38 Envir 16, 28-29 (Oct 1, 1996). Most of these memberships and contributions are
for national environmental groups. Id.
" One manifestation of this is the political support for federal legislation to preserve
and protect environmental resources in remote locations, such as the Alaska National
Wildlife Refuge and the old-growth forests in the northwestern United States that provide
habitat for the northern spotted owl. In addition, contingent valuation methodology
("CVM") surveys have elicited significant willingness-to-pay values from respondents to
preserve resources located elsewhere. See A. Myrick Freeman, III, Nonuse Values in
Natural Resource Damage Assessment, in Raymond J. Kopp and V. Kerry Smith, eds,
Valuing Natural Assets: The Economics of Natural Resource Damage Assessment 264, 292-
95 (Resources for the Future 1993) (reviewing results of studies). The reliability of CVM
surveys in eliciting reliable economic values has been sharply questioned. See, for exam-
ple, Jerry Hausman, ed, Contingent Valuation: A Critical Assessment 217-23 (Elsevier
Science 1993). Even if such criticisms are correct, CVM survey results do show significant
public concern and support for preservation and protection of environmental and natural
resources throughout the nation.
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regulatory measures designed to protect natural resources of
special rarity, beauty, or other significance. But public opinion
and political support for other far-reaching forms of federal envi-
ronmental regulation, including air and water pollution control
and toxic waste regulation and cleanup suggest that these as-
pects of environmental quality are also regarded as part of the
national good.5" This regard is probably to a considerable extent
symbolic, but that in no way diminishes its political and social
significance. 9 To the extent that environmental protection is a
symbolic good, public support for regulatory measures need not
be based solely on environmental problems faced by individuals
within their own locality, and can more readily be regarded as
part of the national good.
If environmental quality is viewed as a national good, the
benefits of environmental protection measures to deal with local
pollution, toxic wastes, or habitat alteration are no longer indi-
vidual and local but national and collective, undercutting the
usual assumptions of the welfare economic/optimal environmen-
tal jurisdictional analysis, which generally defines environmental
quality in terms of factors experienced directly by individuals
(such as levels of pollution), making environmental policy a func-
tion of aggregate individual preferences, costs, and benefits."
This analysis is methodologically "bottom up." It presumes that
decentralized regulation is preferable because of variations in
individual preferences and local circumstances. Centralized regu-
lation is justified only if there are severe "decentralization fail-
ures" due to causes such as the "race to the bottom" or systematic
state underprovision because of political distortions. To the ex-
tent, however, that environmental quality is regulated as a na-
tional good, a presumption in favor of a "top down" approach is
By contrast, public support for environmental protection measures outside the
United States is, for the most part, dramatically less than support for comparable mea-
sures within the United States, and appreciably less than the public support within many
Western European nations for international environmental protection measures. The
problems in mobilizing U.S. domestic political support for international environmental
initiatives are discussed in Paarlberg, 38 Envir at 16 (cited in note 56).
9 See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 Ecol L Q 233 (1990).
" Such analysis could accommodate local demands for national environmental
quality to the extent that individuals in a given locality are concerned about and would be
willing to pay for protection of environmental quality in other localities. But such analysis
is implausible in its own terms; an individual's willingness to pay for environmental
quality in each of thousands of other localities would be non-existent or minimal. More
important, it misconceives the structure of the regard and support for environmental
quality as a national good.
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logical: environmental programs should presumptively be federal
unless "centralization failure" dictates decentralization.
This still leaves, however, the public choice puzzle of how the
commitments of individuals to environmental protection can be
mobilized to offset the organizational advantages enjoyed by
.firms, unions, and other organized economic interests. If individ-
uals qua citizens view environmental protection as a national
good entailing common responsibilities, the free-rider impedi-
ments to collective action that exist under an individual consum-
er model of behavior may be lessened. Environmental groups
may more readily gain support. Common (but not necessarily
coordinated) opinions and votes in favor of environmental protec-
tion may be more readily forthcoming. These questions, however,
require far more study. The fact of strong and politically effective
general public demand for federal environmental regulation re-
mains to be fully explained.
To say, however, that Americans regard and demand envi-
ronmental quality as a national good is only a starting point for
further analysis. Environmental quality is a highly complex and
variable good that comes in many shapes and sizes. Scientific
and technical complexity and uncertainty abound. Many different
types of government measures can be deployed to promote envi-
ronmental protection. The appropriate means for securing envi-
ronmental quality is often complex and obscure. The media and
political and policy entrepreneurs, including environmental
groups and industrial, labor, and other organized commercial
interests, play a key role in mobilizing and shaping public con-
cern for environmental protection, defining the "problem," setting
priorities, and advancing solutions.
The existing system of centralized federal command-and-
control regulation and liability that has emerged out of this unti-
dy tug and pull of factors and interests displays many grievous
flaws. These include excessive rigidity and cost, barriers to inno-
vation, lack of democratic political accountability, skewed priori-
ties, excessive delay and transaction costs, and excessive legaliza-
tion. 1 Given the status of environmental quality as a national
good, however, the appropriate response is not wholesale federal
deregulation and devolution of regulatory responsibilities to low-
er levels of government. Advocates of dismantling the existing
" See Richard B. Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U Chi L Rev 335, 341-46 (1990);
Cass Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 Stan L
Rev 247, 257-68 (1996).
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federal environmental regulatory system, including policy schol-
ars and the more agressive of House Republicans, have wholly
failed to persuade."2 Accordingly, the question is how to advance
the national commitment to environmental quality through new
forms and structures that respond to the need for intelligent
priority setting, avoid economic waste, reduce the dysfunctions of
over-centralized regulation, and provide appropriate flexibility to
deal with variations in local circumstances and accommodate
values of local decisionmaking, which remain important.' In
short, the aim is not to dismantle but to reconstitute national
environmental law and policy.
Some aspects of the centralization failures of our federal
environmental regulatory system have been moderated by giving
state regulators a substantial role in the implementation and
enforcement of federal law. This development assumed increasing
importance in the 1980s, once the basic apparatus of federal
statutes and regulations had been established and attention
shifted to implementation and enforcement. This arrangement
avoids the need to create a more massive, duplicative federal
administrative apparatus, takes advantage of state regulators'
familiarity with local circumstances, and affords a degree of flexi-
bility in adjusting regulatory requirements to those circumstanc-
es." Further, states generally enjoy the latitude to adopt mea-
sures more stringent than those required by federal law, and
many have done so. These arrangements are not inconsistent
with the status of environmental quality as a national good. The
states no less than the federal government can be instruments
for realizing national goals. Opinion polls indicate that the public
wants both the federal and the state governments to play a sub-
2 See John H. Cushman Jr., GOP Backing Off from Tough Stand over Environment,
NY Times Al (Jan 26, 1996); Dennis Farney and Timothy Noah, Down to Earth: Environ-
mental Stands Alienate Some Backers of the GOP's Agenda, Wall St J Al (Mar 5, 1996);
James Gerstenzaang and Janet Hook, GOP Drops Bill to Rein in Laws on Environment,
LA Times 1 (Mar 6, 1996).
' See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandat-
ing State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L J 1196, 1231-32
(1977).
" Federal environmental regulatory statutes provide various arrangements and
incentives for state implementation and enforcement of federal requirements, including
program delegation to the states, conditional federal financial assistance, and sanctions
such as bans on new construction and cutoffs of federal highway funds. While these
arrangements can be viewed as a successful instance of "cooperative federalism," they can
also be regarded as an undesirable form of federal conscription of state government that
undermines local autonomy and self-determination. See Stewart, 86 Yale L J at 1231-32
(cited in note 63).
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stantial role in environmental protection, according a clear pref-
erence to neither." The public, consistent with Madison's view
of the states and the federal government as competitors in pro-
moting the public good, seems to favor this redundancy as provid-
ing greater assurance of effective environmental protection.
Other means of alleviating centralization failure, including
better prioritization of federal regulation through comparative
risk analysis and expanded consideration of costs in regulatory
decisionmaking, are discussed in other articles in this sympo-
sium.' This article summaries a number of additional means of
addressing centralization failure." Some of these options involve
additional measures for restructuring or redirecting federal regu-
lation, while others provide for expanded flexibility and a mea-
sure of decentralization within the overarching structure of feder-
al law.
Thus, one poll found that 44 percent of respondents stated that state governments
should have more responsibility for achieving environmental protection goals, 45 percent
preferred the federal government, and 10 percent both. NBC News/Wall Street Journal
Poll (Dec 13, 1994) (on file with author). A second poll found that 16 percent of survey
respondents placed "a great deal" of confidence and 69 percent placed "some" confidence in
state governments to protect the environment. The comparable figures for the federal
government were 22 percent and 66 percent. Louis Harris & Associates Survey (Dec 6,
1995) (on file with author). Another poll which asked for respondents' preferences among
federal, state, and local government found that 29 percent of respondents stated that the
federal government should be primarily responsible for environmental regulation and
protection, 31 percent favored state government, and 27 percent preferred local govern-
ment. League of Conservatiop Voters Education Fund (Nov 9, 1994) (on file with author).
These results appear to reflect a public preference for a combined or partnership ap-
proach.
" See John D. Graham, Legislative Approaches to Achieving More Protection Against
Risk at Less Cost, 1997 U Chi Legal F 13; Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and
Science: Surveying the Risk-Assessment Battlefield, 1997 U Chi Legal F 59; Cass R.
Sunstein, Which Risks First?, 1997 U Chi Legal F 101.
67 The measures described below are illustrative rather than exhaustive. For exam-
ple, this Article does not discuss information-based strategies to inform workers, consum-
ers, investors, and neighbors about the environmental performance of firms, facilities, and
products; deposit-refund or tradeable permit systems for hazardous wastes; incentive pric-
ing for household waste disposal; environmental auditing and self-regulation; elimination
of agricultural, energy, and other subsidies that encouraged wasteful use of environmental
resources; removal of market barriers to more efficient resource use; government "pump-
priming" for technological innovation; and charges or taxes on waste generation and
pollutants such as greenhouse gases.
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III. ELEMENTS OF A RECONSTITUTED FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY
A. Research, Information, and Analysis
Because environmental quality is a national good, and be-
cause of economies of scale, it is essential to have an extensive
program of federal research, information gathering, and analysis
to measure the components of environmental quality, identify
means for achieving it, and calculate its cost in terms of forgoing
other national objectives. Although the amount of federal envi-
ronmental research and analysis is enormous, it has not been
organized and the results have not been presented in a manner
that promotes informed public debate and decisionmaking.
Much of the work is done by regulatory or program agencies such
as the EPA, the Department of Energy, and the Department of
the Interior. Their research, data-gathering, analysis, and report-
ing is often driven (or perceived to be driven) by the agencies'
regulatory objectives and constituency interests. 9 On the other
hand, the research output of the federal science agencies is often
not well-geared to decisions about regulatory policy.7" Moreover,
the activities of these various federal agencies are fragmented;
there is no systematic, integrated account of the nation's environ-
mental performance, problems, options, and priorities. The annu-
al reports by the Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ")
partially filled this gap by providing an overview and discussion
of environmental quality and regulatory priorities and options.
CEQ's reports, however, often reflected parochial agency con-
cerns, and were discontinued following the absorption of CEQ
into the White House political apparatus. A comprehensive, syn-
optic overview and analysis of the nation's environmental situa-
tion less tied to the immediate preoccupations of federal regulato-
6' One report, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Unfinished Business: A Com-
parative Assessment of Environmental Problems (EPA 1987), which assesses relative
environmental risks and suggests a correlative retargeting of regulatory priorities, is a
notable exception to this generalization.
6 See, for example, Robert W. Crandall, Frederick H. Rueter, and Wilbur A. Steger,
Clearing the Air: EPA's Self Assessment of Clean-Air Policy, 19 Regulation 35, 45-46 (No 4,
1996) (criticizing EPA study of costs and benefits of Clean Air Act regulations). The study
has been defended by the EPA officias responsible for it. See Robert D. Brenner and Rich-
ard D. Morgenstern, In Response to "Clearing the Air", 19 Regulation 47 (No 4, 1996).
70 See National Research Council, Committee on Environmental Decision Making,
Decision Making in the Environmental Protection Agency: Case Studies (National Academy
of Sciences 1977).
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ry agencies could stimulate public deliberation over priorities and
possibly promote sectoral planning and performance-based evalu-
ation in lieu of the bean-counting that dominates current evalua-
tions of environmental regulatory performance.
The new European Environmental Agency ("EEA") has been
regarded as unduly weak because its functions are currently
limited to information gathering and reporting.71 But that limi-
tation may be its strength. As an independent authority with an
eye to policy relevance, the EEA is on the way to producing a
comprehensive, synthetic overview and analysis of environmental
and natural resource conditions and trends in Europe of a sort
that is missing in the United States.72 Other possible models for
the United States include the Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development's ("OECD") reports on the environmental
policies and performance of its member states,7" or the
Netherlands' national environmental inventory and sectoral
plan.74 Such functions might be carried out within the federal
government by a hybrid entity, combining elements of the Con-
gressional Budget Office, the Office of Science and Technology
Policy, and the National Academy of Sciences-National Research
Council.75 Its responsibilities could include tracking not only
environmental quality data and trends, environmental technolo-
gies, and policy options, but also risk analysis and management,
methodologies for systematically accounting for the costs and
benefits of environmental programs, and the development of
innovative environmental regulatory instruments. Any such enti-
ty would necessarily draw heavily on the research and data of
federal environmental regulatory and resource management
agencies. Contrary to what Justice Breyer envisages,7" such an
71 See Note, The European Environmental Agency, 1 Buff J Intl L 243, 245 (1994).
72 See Edward Moy, Recent Developments Note: The European Environmental Agency,
1 Buff J Intl L 243 (1994); Marlisc Simons, European Green Police Have Carrot But No
Stick, NY Times 1-3 (Sept 8, 1996).
" See Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Environmental
Performance Reviews: United States (OECD 1996).
"' See Jit A. Peters, Voluntary Agreements Between Government and Industry: The
Basic Metal Covenant, in Jan. M. Van Dunn, ed, Environmental Contracts and Cove-
nants: New Instruments for a Realistic Environmental Policy? 19 (Vermande Lelystad
1993).
" Compare Paul R. Portney, Reforming Environmental Regulation: Three Modest
Proposals, Issues in Sci & Tech 74, 75-77 (Winter 1988) (proposing a "quasi-independent"
Bureau of Environmental Statistics within the federal EPA). Locating this function within
the EPA would, however, neglect environmental matters under the jurisdiction of other
federal agencies, such as the Department of the Interior.
76 See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation
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entity should not be involved in reviewing particular regulatory
decisions, but instead should generate information relevant for
use by government decision makers (including legislators and
Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") reviewers), the me-
dia, and the public. Therein would lie its comparative advantage
and its strength.
B. Focusing on Resource Efficiency
Maintaining or improving environmental quality while sus-
taining economic growth requires a continuous reduction in the
amount of residuals or other environmental perturbations gener-
ated per unit of output: that is, continually enhanced resource
efficiency. Our environmental regulatory programs have emerged
piecemeal, dealing in an independent and uncoordinated fashion
with different residuals in different media from different waste
streams. The resulting patchwork of regulations has often shifted
environmental problems from one waste stream or media to an-
other. Because of heavy reliance on "best available technology"
("BAT") approaches and the need, within a centralized system of
regulation, to devise regulatory requirements that can be fol-
lowed by different plants within a given industry category, there
has been widespread adoption of regulations based on "end of
pipe" measures. This approach, together with the uncoordinated
welter of particularistic regulations, does not encourage, and
indeed often precludes, managers from adopting process changes
and production methods that would reduce the overall generation
of residuals. A focus on resource efficiency would reorient regula-
tory thinking and focus it on innovative means of reducing the
overall burden of pollution and waste. It would also relieve un-
necessary burdens on U.S. industry and promote its competitive-
ness. This shift would require wider adoption of alternatives to
command and control regulation, including tradeable pollution
permits and facility-wide risk bubbles, that permit greater flexi-
bility and stronger incentives for innovation and investment in
reducing consumption of non-renewable resources and generation
of residuals. These alternatives are discussed below.77 Further,
national environmental accounting systems and inventories
should include resource efficiency indicators and data. To the
extent that national technology-based requirements are retained,
59-68 (Harvard 1993).
" See Parts III.D and III.E.
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individual facilities should, as discussed below, enjoy latitude to
depart from these requirements through emissions trading or
facility-wide environmental management programs, provided that
the same basic level of environmental protection is achieved.
C. Geographically Variable Ambient Standards
Ambient environmental quality standards should be the
foundation of environmental regulatory policy because they focus
on the ultimate good sought-a healthy, ecologically-resilient
environment. Emissions, effluent limitations, and other regulato-
ry measures are only a means to achieving this goal. As previ-
ously noted, U.S. environmental regulatory requirements have to
a large extent been based on BAT measures. While technology-
based regulations offer significant administrative advantages for
regulators and are an effective way of achieving initial reductions
in pollution, in the long run they create waste, promote rent-
seeking, and impair needed flexibility. Reliance on such measures
should be regarded as a transitional strategy that has achieved
significant reductions or limitations of pollution in the initial
phase of regulatory programs, but should gradually be discarded
in favor of a focus on environmental quality and risk manage-
ment. This transition is already beginning to occur under the
Clean Water Act, which for twenty years was focused on adoption
and implementation of nationally uniform BAT effluent limita-
tions.7" Today, ambient water quality standards, rather than
federal effluent limitations, are increasingly determinative of
control requirements,79 creating both the opportunity and the
incentive for more flexible control strategies such as point
source/nonpoint source trading.0
Moreover, there is no reason why ambient environmental
quality standards or risk management objectives established
pursuant to federal law should be geographically uniform. There
are commonly no sharp medical or ecological thresholds that
distinguish "safe" from "unsafe" levels of pollution. Further, there
78 See, for example, 33 USC § 1311 (1982).
79 See, for example, 33 USC § 1311 (1994).
'o Under this approach, point sources of pollution, such as industrial dischargers and
municipal waste treatment plants, can achieve ambient water quality standards by
contracting with nonpoint pollution sources-such as farms--that are not subject to
federal BAT regulation, to reduce their discharges. Point source dischargers, however,
may not use trading to exceed the discharge levels required by federal BAT standards.
See Peter S. Menell and Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Law and Policy 504-517
(Little, Brown 1994).
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are often significant local variations in geography, weather, ecolo-
gy, population, level and nature of development patterns, costs of
achieving environmental objectives, and community priorities.
The national good of environmental quality does not mandate
uniformity in regulatory measures. We are not dealing with indi-
vidual rights on a civil rights model."1 The collective good of en-
vironmental quality can accommodate a measure of diversity in
methods and results. In considerable degree, this is inescapable
because of the local and regional differences noted above. These
realities are already reflected in federal environmental law. The
Prevention of Significant Deterioration ("PSD") program authoriz-
es states (subject to certain procedural requirements and sub-
stantive constraints) to choose among various levels of increases
in existing ambient concentrations of air pollutants that are
below the national ambient air quality standards. s2 The Clean
Water Act authorizes states to designate water uses and corre-
sponding ambient water quality standards in accordance with
their circumstances and priorities, subject to EPA review and
overriding federal requirements with respect to waters of nation-
al or interstate significance." The Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990 adopted differential requirements for different non-attain-
ment regions throughout the country based on the degree to
which air quality exceeds national ambient standards.8"
Accommodating local and regional variations with respect to
pollution is, in general, better accommodated by allowing states a
degree of flexibility within a federal framework than by having
the federal government adopt different standards for different
regions."5 Accordingly, federal programs should not only shift
RI See Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 Ga L Rev 916 (1985).
82 42 USC §§ 7422-24 (1994).
See Menell and Stewart, Environmental Law and Policy at 508-17 (cited in note
80).
Pub L No 101-549, 104 Stat 2399, 2423-62, codified at 42 USC §§ 7511-13a (1994).
Professor Krier suggests that the federal government set non-uniform ambient
environmental quality standards. James E. Krier, Environmental Federalism: On the
Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in a Federal System-And Why it Matters,
54 Md L Rev 1226 (1995); James E. Krier, The Irrational National Air Quality Standards:
Macro- and Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA L Rev 323 (1974). As he points out, Congress has
set non-uniform standards through measures such as the prevention of significant deterio-
ration (PSD) program, which imposes limits on the amount of increase in pollution al-
lowed in regions with air quality better than that mandated by nationally uniform air
quality standards. See 42 USC §§ 7470-79. But the PSD program illustrates the potential
pitfalls in non-uniform federal standard-setting. While there is a national interest in
maintaining relatively pristine air quality in national parks and areas with exceptionally
scenic mountainous or other landscapes, the PSD limitations sweep much more broadly to
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from nationally uniform BAT measures to ambient standards and
other risk-based objectives-as discussed above-but should al-
low states or regional authorities a degree of flexibility in choos-
ing appropriate standards within a range of values compatible
with the national good of environmental quality, although in
some cases this flexibility would be trumped by overriding federal
requirements for areas of national significance." This flexibility
should extend not only to water pollution control regulation, but
also to air pollution, toxic wastes, and other residuals. As noted
above, a measure of variation in federal environmental require-
ment already exists because of the states' substantial role in im-
plementation and enforcement. It would be healthy to acknowl-
edge the desirability of decentralized flexibility more explicitly
through local variations in ambient standards.87
A degree of devolution would also be consistent with de-
mands for more rational and more accountable risk prioritization.
Environmental risks are to a substantial degree a function of
local circumstances and concerns. Even as calls are being made
for better risk-prioritization at the federal level, a large number
of states have already embarked on programs to improve such
management. There are indications that it may be easier to en-
gage representatives of the public in successful risk prioritization
efforts at the state than at the national level.88
D. Expanded Use of Tradeable Permit Systems to Address
Widespread Pollution Problems
Tradeable permit programs have been successfully used to
remove lead in gasoline, reduce sulfur emissions, and help phase
out ozone-depleting chemicals. They are also being used to ad-
limit development in vast areas of currently less developed regions that lack strong scenic
values. The PSD limitations were adopted by Congress with the support of representa-
tives from industrialized areas in the East and Midwest because they limit the advantag-
es that less developed and less polluted regions elsewhere in the nation would enjoy in
attracting industry under a system of uniform national air quality standards. See Peter
Pashagian, Whose Self-Interests are Being Protected?, 32 Econ Inquiry 551 (1985).
' See William F. Pedersen, Jr., Turning the Tide on Water Quality, 15 Ecol L Q 69
(1988).
87 The Constitution does not prohibit geographic nonuniformity resulting from such
federal legislation. For discussion of the relevant constitutional principles, see Gerald L.
Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and Self-Determination, 135 U Pa
L Rev 261 (1987).
' See Richard A. Minard, Jr., Comparative Risk and the States, Resources 6 (Resourc-
es for the Future 1996); California Environmental Protection Agency, Risk Assessment
Advisory Committee, A Review of the California Environmental Protection Agency's Risk
Assessment Practices, Policies, and Guidelines (1996).
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dress ozone-type air pollution in Los Angeles.89 Use of trading
programs to deal with widespread or area-type pollutants ought
to be expanded to include ozone pollution in the other regions of
the country, such as the Northeast; fine particulates; and non-
bioaccumulative water pollutants."4 A critical issue in the design
of such programs is the extent to which they should be based
solely on reductions of total pollutant loadings-which implies
unrestricted trading-or whether and how trading of emissions
allowances should be constrained in order to ensure compliance
with applicable ambient standards (or otherwise prevent "hot
spots"),91 or to ensure an equitable allocation of environmental
quality and development opportunities among states that gener-
ate or receive transboundary pollution. These questions raise
significant issues as to the appropriate conception and role of the
local or regional aspects of distributional equity or environmental
justice in relation to the national good of environmental quality.
The "hot spot" issue can be addressed through zoning mecha-
nisms that vary trading, ratios between geographical zones or
seasons of the year, 2 or by framing the trading entitlement in
terms of ambient impacts or other. measures of environmental
degradation rather than emissions.93 The more the system is
refined to prevent exceedences of ambient standards, however,
the greater the transaction costs and the more restricted the
trading opportunities, undercutting the efficiency advantages of
the trading system. Other distributional issues among regions
can be addressed through entitlement allocations through federal
rules."
" See Vivian Foster and Robert Hahn, Designing More Efficient Markets: Lessons
From Los Angeles Smog Control, 38 J L & Econ 19 (1995); Matthew Polesetsky, Will a
Market in Air Pollution Clean the Nation's Dirtiest Air? A Study of the South Coast Air
Quality Management District's Regional Clean Air Incentives Market, 22 Ecol L Q 359
(1995).
0 See Economic Incentive Program Rules, 40 CFR § 51; Perry S. Goldscheen, Going
Mobile: Emissions Trading Gets a Boost From Mobile Source Emission Reduction Credits,
13 UCLA J Envir L & Pol 225 (1994-1995).
" Adoption of geographically variable ambient standards, as discussed above, could
provide desirable flexibility in this regard.
' See Dale A. Carlson and Anne M. Sholtz, Lessons From Southern California for
Environmental Markets, 1 Envir L & Prac 15 (Jan-Feb 1994); Thomas Holloway and
Cindy Jacobs, Issues in Designing a Seasonally Sensitive NO, Emission Trading System, 2
Envir L & Prac 12 (Jan-Feb 1995) (discussing seasonal fluctuations and trading systems).
' See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144
U Pa L Rev 2341, 2376-94 (1996).
' Id.
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In order to address climate change, tradeable permit systems
could also be used to limit carbon emissions or, preferably, all
greenhouse gases (with use of an indexing system based on the
relative radiative forcing and residence time of different gases).
Because greenhouse gases are globally mixed, the hot spot issue
does not arise.
E. Facility-Wide Risk Bubbles
The rigidities, end-of-pipe focus, fragmentation, and gaps and
inconsistencies in federal regulation of different residuals in dif-
ferent waste streams to different media under different regulato-
ry statutes and requirements is a serious impedient to innovation
and adoption of resource-efficient, cost-effective methods of pollu-
tion prevention and control.95  The widely-cited joint
EPA/industry study of Amoco's Yorktown facility found that a
comprehensive, plant-wide, multimedia approach (including re-
siduals in air and water and on land) that allowed Amoco to
reallocate existing command-and-control requirements among
residuals, waste streams, and media could achieve the same
overall level of environmental protection at a small fraction of
the cost of complying with existing fragmented regulatory re-
quirements, but that such flexibility was forbidden by federal
law." One potential solution to this problem is to attempt to in-
tegrate the various media-specific or residual-specific federal
environmental regulatory statutes and regulations, perhaps on
an industry sector-by-sector basis, in order to achieve a more
coordinated and consistent overall program of pollution preven-
tion and resource efficiency.97 But the inherent characteristics of
centralized environmental regulation-the problems in central-
ized gathering, processing, and utilization of information about
the vast and diverse array of facilities and environmental condi-
tions throughout the nation, and the bureaucratic need to subdi-
vide tasks into discrete, manageable units-are likely to sharply
limit what can be achieved by such a strategy, at least in the
' See Daniel J. Fiorino, Toward a New System of Environmental Regulation: The
Case for an Industry Sector Approach, 26 Envir L 457 (1996).
See National Academy of Public Administration, Setting Priorities, Getting Results:
A New Direction for the Environmental Protection Agency 97-98 (1995); David Stamps,
Making a Case for Facility-Wide Compliance, Envir Info Digest 69 (Oct 1992); Amoco and
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Amoco/U.S. EPA Pollution Prevention Project:
Executive Summary 15-18 (1992).
" See, for example, Frances H. Irwin, An Integrated Framework for Preventing
Pollution and Protecting the Environmental, 22 Envir L 1 (1992).
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United States. 8 A more promising alternative is to decentralize
the determination of appropriate pollution prevention and control
measures by giving individual facilities the flexibility to vary the
otherwise applicable nationally uniform limitations on different
residuals generated in different media by different waste
streams, provided that overall health and environmental protec-
tion risk thresholds, established by or by reference to federal law,
are not exceeded."
For example, a risk baseline might be established by refer-
ence to the actual or allowable residuals for a given facility, as
defined by current federal regulatory requirements. The resulting
flexibility would create an internal, facility-wide "market" that
would allow facility managers to pursue the most cost-effective
means of achieving overall environmental quality goals and pro-
vide the flexibility and incentives for development and use of
innovative means for preventing pollution and achieving resource
efficiency. In order to ensure the widest application of this strate-
gy, federal authorities would have to develop a common set of
indices of the risks associated with different pollutants in dif-
ferent waste streams. Plant-wide risk bubbles could be imple-
mented and enforced through environmental covenants between
facilities and state regulatory authorities that would establish
the aggregate risk quota and otherwise operationalize the risk
bubble concept for a given facility, require appropriate monitor-
ing and reporting, and provide the basis for sanctions for viola-
tions of its terms."° Permit trading among facilities for area-
wide pollutants could be used together with facility-wide risk
bubbles to provide added flexibility. 1
" See James E. Krier and Mark Brownstein, On Integrated Pollution Control, 22
Envir L 119 (1992).
" There may also be significant opportunities for optimization of waste streams
among different facilities within a given locality or among different facilities within a
given firm; these opportunities could be addressed through locality-wide or firm-wide risk
bubbles.
" Environmental covenants are being used or introduced in a number of Western
European countries on an industry-wide basis as well as for individual facilities. See Jan
M. Van Dunnd, ed, Environmental Contracts and Covenants: New Instruments for a
Realistic Environmental Policy (Vermande Lelystad 1993); Wendy Gauziel, The Dutch
Model: Lessons for the U.S. (EPA 1995); Special Report: Voluntary Accords Seen as Way to
Perfect Environment While Remaining Competitive, Intl Envir Reporter (BNA) 585 (July
26, 1995). An early proposal for use of the risk bubble approach in the United States is
found in Paul R. Portney, Issues in Sci & Tech at 77-79 (cited in note 75).
10' Thus, a facility might be allowed to generate residuals in excess of its risk bubble
cap provided that the excess consisted of area-wide pollutants for which it holds permits;
the tradeable permit system would ensure that the excess emissions were offset by limita-
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Considerations of distributional equity and environmental
justice will again be critical in determining how much flexibility
states or localities should enjoy in determining appropriate ag-
gregate risk levels and whether constraints should be placed on
trading among different pollutants and media within the facility's
risk bubble in order to prevent particular discharges that would
cause otherwise applicable ambient standards to be exceeded or
otherwise generate unacceptable hot spots. Adequate monitoring
and verification of a facility's overall performance will also be
critical. Increased federal funding for state and local environmen-
tal regulatory agencies should be provided to support the added
responsibilities that they would assume under this approach.
As part of the Clinton Administration's Reinventing Environ-
mental Regulation program, the EPA has taken a number of
initiatives to promote flexibility and innovation in environmental
management, including, in particular, Project XL, which aims to
provide sources or facilities latitude to vary otherwise applicable
regulatory agreements in exchange for an improved overall level
of environmental performance."° Implementation of the pro-
gram, however, has been hampered by several factors, including
the EPA's inability to protect firms from legal challenges to non-
compliance with otherwise applicable regulatory requirements,
and environmental advocates' objections to flexibility that would al-
low facilities to increase a given type of pollution or waste. 3
F. Habitat and Ecosystem Preservation and Management
Conservation of biodiversity poses enormous challenges that
will require new approaches to replace the current hodgepodge of
highly decentralized management of the public lands by federal
resource agencies; command-and-control federal regulation of
private development under the Endangered Species Act"4 and
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act; 0 5 and the primacy of state,
local and private land use authority in most other respects. The
need for a national survey of biological and ecological resources
and development of options for conservation and management is
tions of emissions by other sources in the relevant area.
o See Fiorino, 26 Envir L at 472-82 (cited in note 95).
o See Turner T. Smith, Regulatory Resource in the USA and Europe, 8 J Envir L
251, 270-271 (1996); John H. Cushman, Jr., E.P.A. and Arizona Factory Agree on Innova-
tive Regulatory Plan, NY Times A18 (Nov 20, 1996).
"4 16 USC § 1531 et seq (1994 & Supp 1996).
"4 33 USC § 1344 (1994).
226 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1997:
critical. For reasons described above, however, this responsibility
should probably be vested in an entity other than the Depart-
ment of the Interior whose regulatory proclivities would arouse
suspicion and hostility to such a survey."° In order to succeed,
ecosystem conservation, including conservation of habitats that
support current or potential future endangered and threatened
species, cannot be limited to the public lands but must include
private lands as well. The history of environmental regulation,
however, shows that federal efforts to regulate private land use
have been highly controversial, and that federal attempts to con-
trol local land use decisions in order to promote federal environ-
mental objectives have generally been quite unsuccessful. The
Department of the Interior has sought to secure adoption of habi-
tat conservation plans ("HCP") that include private as well as
government-owned lands. It has combined the "stick" of enforcing
the Endangered Species Act's ban on habitat modification that
adversely affects members of threatened or endangered species
with the "carrot" of issuing incidental take permissions for such
modifications if landowners agree to participate in a
governmentally approved HCP. The HCP program, which has
counterparts in some states, has been slow to develop, in part
because of the need to reach agreement on a plan among many
private and governmental stakeholders; yet, some successes have
been achieved." 7 Another problem is the Department of the
Interior's limited ability to provide binding "safe harbor" legal
assurances to landowners who agree to participate in an HCP
that they will not be subject to additional restrictions because of
future listing of a new species as threatened or endangered."°
Other promising incentive systems that could promote conserva-
tion objectives on private lands include wetlands banking and
trading and other forms of transferrable development rights,
including a habitat trading program."° Conservation on public
' See Part III.A.
107 See Michael J. Bean, Sarah G. Fitzgerald and Michael A. O'Connell, Reconciling
Conflict Under the Endangered Species Act: The Habitat Conservation Planning Experi-
ence 35-50 (World Wildlife Fund 1991); Jon Welner, Natural Communities Conservation
Planning: An Ecosystem Approach to Protecting Endangered Species, 47 Stan L Rev 319
(1995).
,o See Eric Fisher, Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act:
No Surprises and the Quest for Certainty, 67 U Colo L Rev 381, 387-97 (1996).
1"9 David Sohn and Madeline Cohen, From Smokestacks to Species: Extending the
Tradeable Permit Approach from Air Pollution to Habitat Conservation, 15 Stan Envir L J
405 (1996); James T. B. Tripp and Daniel J. Dudek, Institutional Guideline for Designing
Successful Transferable Rights Program, 6 Yale J Reg 369, 378-82 (1989) (discussing
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lands could be encouraged by phasing out below-cost timbering,
grazing, and other forms of wasteful resource use and cashing in




Air pollution from motor vehicles has two principal compo-
nents of significant environmental concern: ozone precursors (HC
and NO2), and CO. A central question is the relative extent to
which these emissions should be addressed by reducing the
amount of emissions per vehicle mile traveled ("VMT"), and by
reducing VMT. The current federal regulatory program focuses
almost exclusively on the former through new motor vehicle
emissions controls and controls on fuels. In the case of new motor
vehicles, achieving still further reductions in ozone precursor
emissions per vehicle while simultaneously addressing C02 emis-
sions will require basic shifts in fuels and engines (particularly to
diesels in the intermediate term, which raises concerns about
fine particulate emissions) and reductions in vehicle size and
weight-changes that run directly counter to recent trends in the
United States. Because emissions are already so tightly con-
trolled, the marginal cost of additional limitations on HC and
NO2 emissions per VMT from new vehicles is very high. HC and
NO2 emissions from vehicles in use could be further limited
through strengthened inspection and maintenance programs, but
such measures are politically quite unpopular. Federal efforts to
limit VMT through transportation or land use controls have
largely been a failure."i Federal highway construction grants,
on the other hand, have been used in ways that have stimulated
enormous growth in VMT.
There are several options for dealing with these daunting
challenges. Regional ozone precursor emissions permit trading
programs could initially include new motor vehicle emissions and
motor vehicle fuels as well as stationary sources, and be later
transferrable development rights programs for conservation of the New Jersey Pine
Barrens).
11o See Randal OToole, Reforming the Forest Service (Island 1988); Donald R. Leal,
Turning a Profit in Public Forests S-4 (PERC 1995).
. See Penny Mintz, Transportation Alternatives Within the Clean Air Act: A History
of Congressional Failure to Effectuate and Recommendations for the Future, 3 NYU Envir
L J 156 (1994); Alan C. Waltner, Paradise Delayed-The Continuing Saga of the Los
Angeles Basin Federal Clean Air Act Implementation Plan, 14 UCLA J Envir L & Pol 247,
252-63 (1995-1996).
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extended gradually to existing vehicles. Such measures would
ensure a cost-effective allocation of abatement burdens, reduce
total compliance costs, provide strong incentive for resource effi-
ciency, and also provide growing incentives for limiting VMT.
Tradeable permits for carbon emissions, or, preferably, emissions
of all greenhouse gases ("GHG"), could be phased in gradually. As
discussed above, states or regions could also be given the flexibil-
ity to adopt ambient standards for ozone within a range; a simi-
lar range could be provided for compliance deadlines. Regions
would thereby be given both the opportunity and the responsibili-
ty to establish, within limits, their own priorities.112 Highway
construction and other subsidies for automobile use... could
gradually be phased out or redirected to transportation measures
aimed at reducing VMT, perhaps through use of regional VMT
bubble caps. Remote sensing technology could be used for
highway use pricing (including congestion pricing) as part of a
VMT bubble strategy, with the proceeds used for highway and
mass transport improvements. Such a step toward the privatiza-
tion of transportation services could ease opposition to changes
by improving the quality of service provided. Taxes based on
emissions which take into account mileage as well as emissions
per mile are perhaps the best option from a theoretical
viewpoint, 14 but are wholly infeasible politically at the present.
CONCLUSION
Adoption of new approaches to securing the national good of
environmental quality will depend critically on the intermediar-
ies who determine or influence how public demand for environ-
112 The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments modify the previous one-size-fits-all scheme
of regulatory targets and timetables for attainment of the nationally uniform federal
ozone standards. They classify ozone non-attainment regions in categories depending on
the extent of non-attainment and provide different compliance deadlines for different
categories; the further out of compliance that a region currently is, the longer the period
provided for attainment. 104 Stat at 2423-52, codified at 42 USC §§ 7511-11e. However,
all regions must (supposedly) eventually meet the same uniform national standard;
regions have no flexibility in deciding which category they are in; and highly detailed con-
trol measures for achieving compliance with these requirements are mandated by the Act.
Id.
113 The World Resources Institute has estimated that automobile-related subsidies, in-
cluding road construction, tax deductions, and employer-provided parking, total $300
billion a year, equivalent to an additional $2 tax on each gallon of gasoline. James J.
MacKenzie, Roger C. Dower, and Donald D.T. Chen, The Going Rate: What It Really Costs
to Drive (World Resources Institute 1992).
' See Robert Innes, Regulating Automobile Pollution Under Certainty, Competition,
and Imperfect Information, 31 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 219, 222-35 (1996).
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mental quality is channeled into the design and implementation
of concrete environmental policy measures. These intermediaries
are political and policy entrepreneurs, the media, legislators,
regulators and administrators, environmental groups, industry,
and others. Many of these intermediaries have a strong vested
interest in the existing centralized command and control system.
Many will continue to try to use environmental regulation to
extract rents or otherwise advance their interests. These realities
must be taken into account in any effort to develop and win ac-
ceptance for alternative approaches. Concerns about
distributional equity and environmental justice must also be
taken into account.
On the other hand, the regulatory status quo is coming un-
der increasingly severe pressure because of its inherent inability
to meet demands for maintaining or improving environmental
quality at acceptable economic and social cost. These demands
are likely to intensify with the potential emergence of global
climate change as an overarching environmental issue and in-
creasing recognition of the importance of biodiversity and ecosys-
tem conservation. The increasing interconnection between envi-
ronmental policy and international trade, investment, and compe-
tition will also generate strong pressures to reconstitute the cur-
rent U.S. environmental regulatory status quo in order to elimi-
nate its unnecessary costs, rigidities, and obstructions to innova-
tion and investment, and to substitute incentive systems focused
on resource efficiency. The dominant system of federal command-
and-control regulation was an understandable and reasonably
successful "first generation" response to rapidly emergent envi-
ronmental concerns. It is, however, reaching its inherent limits
as regulatory programs mature and competing environmental
and economic demands escalate. These systemic factors will favor
new approaches to securing the national good of environmental
quality, including those outlined herein as well as others dis-
cussed elsewhere in this Symposium.

